UIC Law Review
Volume 33

Issue 4

Article 19

Summer 2000

Chief Justice Marshall as Modern, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1145
(2000)
Walter J. Kendall III

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Courts Commons, Judges Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Walter J. Kendall III, Chief Justice Marshall as Modern, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1145 (2000)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss4/19
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL AS MODERN
WALTER J. KENDALL III*

INTRODUCTION

Professor Clinton's conclusions about the limited nature of judicial review expressed in his book,' and the reinforcing argument
in his paper 2 that Chief Justice Marshall's theory of constitutional
interpretation was based on the classical legal naturalism of
Grotius, bring to the fore both grand theories and local practices
that have not received the attention they deserve. The breadth and
depth of Clinton's challenge to current views of the Marshall era
and to modern interpretive theories and practices can be ignored
only at the risk of misunderstanding both. Proper response really
requires at least one, if not several, full length essays. Fortunately, the tradition of and constraints on a "commentator" permit
me to isolate several points for focus and critique.
First, I want to challenge Clinton's central claim that Grotius
was the source of, or model for, Marshall's jurisprudence. Second,
accepting the words Clinton refers to as encapsulating Chief Justice Marshall's interpretive approach, I will propose an alternative
understanding of those words. This alternative understanding will
support an argument that Marshall had a more activist understanding of the role of the Court. Third, I will accept Clinton's arguments in his book Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review '
about Marshall's understanding and practice of judicial reviewthat it is limited to threats to the departmental integrity of the
Courts and to cases or controversies where there is an unavoidable
conflict between a statute and the Constitution; that in the first
circumstance, that of threats to the Court's departmental integrity, the findings of the Court are binding on other branches, while

* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. I wish to thank my
colleague Professor Samuel Olken for several helpful conversations about

these matters and for editorial assistance transforming my oral comments into
a written essay.
1. ROBERT L. CLINTON, MARBURY

V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

(1989).
2. Robert L. Clinton, Classical Legal Naturalism and the Politics of John
Marshall'sConstitutionalJurisprudence,33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 935 (2000).
3. CLINTON, supra note 1.
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in the latter, they are not. I will argue that it is the context of the
institutional structure of the times that makes such a limited role
for the Court defensible. However, the modern institutional system requires a more active judiciary. And finally, I want to challenge Clinton's assertion that for Marshall and his contemporaries
there was a single, correct, "true" meaning of the Constitution:
that "the idea that interpretation being called forth by linguistic
uncertainties was essentially unknown."
I.

GROTIUS

Is Hugo Grotius a source of Marshall's jurisprudence? Is
Grotius a proper lens through which to see Marshall more clearly
and accurately? I think it most unlikely both because of the premodern views of Grotius, and for a common sense reason: Grotius
didn't address the role of a judge in a constitutional court in his
treatise! However, it must be said that this conclusion, as all conclusions about Grotius, must be somewhat tentative. It has
recently been said that:
To read Grotius comprehensively is far from easy. He is the last
great figure in whose thought a unity of theology, law, philology,
and history is effective. He was the epitome of late Renaissance
man, a polymath who ranged across the boundaries of our modem
disciplines, and there are few modem readers, even among the
ranks of professional scholars, who can claim the competence to read
the whole of his output with understanding. Furthermore, his style
of writing sets many traps for the incautious. The page is crowded
with quotations--classical, biblical, patristic, occasionally, contemporary-spilled extravagantly across its surface. Only on closer examination do we find that they are quite careless, and often do not
support the case that Grotius himself intends to make, but merely
illustrate the vast range of commonplace and philosophical opinion
through which an encyclopedic discussion has to pick its way. To
discover his own views we must isolate the terse dialectical argument, which develops a complex position so economically that crucial moves can very easily be overlooked. Grotius is a dangerous
person to quote, at least for those whose taste in quotations, like his
own, is confined to single sentences or less.'
It is because of these difficulties and the numerous, but often
conflicting interpretations of Grotius' views,7 that I've adopted the

4. Id. at 81-101.
5. HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (DE JURE BELLI AC

PACIS) (Louise Loomis trans., Walter J. Black, Inc. 1949) (1625).
6. O'DONOVAN AND O'DONOVAN, FROM IRENAEUS TO GROTIUS - A
SOURCEBOOK IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 787 - 88 (1999).
7. See, e.g., RICHARD TUCK, PHILOSOPHY AND GOVERNMENT 1572 - 1651,
Ch. 5 (1993); and PAULINE C. WESTERMAN, THE DISINTEGRATION OF NATURAL
LAW THEORY - AQUINAS TO FINNIS, Chs. 5 and 6 (1998) (Westerman disagrees

with Tuck about the degree of equivocation in Grotius concerning the prece-
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strategy used by Michael P. Zuckert in Natural Rights and the
New Republicanism8 in an attempt to fix Grotius' place in the history of thought. Zuckert takes five basic points from the Declaration of Independence and fixes a theorist's place in the history of
thought, in part by comparing his ideas to five fundamental ones
expressed in the Declaration of Independence. I will compare, as
does Zuckert, some of Grotius' ideas with those expressed in the
Declaration of Independence, a document of both historical and
philosophical importance to John Marshall and the other postRevolutionary jurists.
One fundamental premise of the Declaration of Independence
is the notion that government is an artifact instituted among people to serve their ends. Alexander Hamilton and other American
revolutionaries ultimately crafted a constitutional system based,
in large part, upon this seminal concept. As Hamilton himself explained in The Federalist No. 1, the Constitution is all about
"whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing
good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are
forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident or force."9 Grotius, however, assumed "there was no 'state of
nature,' no uninformed, pre-social human existence," ° and that
there was always a society or some form of government.
On the other hand, some scholars suggest that at a certain
point Grotius "no longer view[ed] society as a natural association,
but as an artificial one."" While this statement may be confusing
society and the nation-state, it cannot be doubted that Grotius recognized that humans have a "desire for society, that is, for life in a
community" that is sufficiently strong that "we should not grant as
a universal proposition" that self-interest rules people's actions."
This certainly differs from Hobbes' supposition of the natural state
of people at war with each other," and from Locke's more pacific
state of nature. If this view of Grotius is correct, and he influenced Marshall, then Marshall is less a liberal and more a republidence of one's own good over that of another person (supra at 135) and about
Grotius' views on the alienability of individual rights (supra at 172)).
8. (1994).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
10. O'DONOVAN AND O'DONOVAN, supra note 6, at 790.
11. WESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 164.
12. GROTIUS, supra note 5, Preface at para. 6. The proper or better charac-

terization of Marshall's views is discussed at length by Hobson. Charles Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law, 34 John
Marshall Law Review 16-25 and related footnotes (1996).
13. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).

14. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690).

15. The proper or better characterization of Marshall's views is discussed at
length by Hobson. Charles Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall

and the Rule of Law, 34 John Marshall Law Review 16-25 and related footnotes (1996).
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can than some argue."
A second point is that the Declaration of Independence set as
the end of government the security of life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness among the individual rights. Grotius, however, did
not see rights (jus) as fully separate or distinct from law (lex) or
government. While Grotius did not share Aquinas' notions of the
subordination of right to (natural and divine) law, he did retain a
positive relational or interpersonal notion as a part of his understanding of right."0 His theory was thus merely transitional to the
more individualistic view of the Declaration.
The Declaration of Independence also addresses the question
of consent. The Declaration says "governments ... deriv(e) their

just powers from the consent of the governed." Grotius focused in
his book on war and peace. He believed that agreements between
States are essential for peace, so he gave consent or agreement as
the source of right or obligation more meaningfulness than prior
thinkers. Grotius did speak of a majority as possessing the rights
of a whole, 7 but he allowed that the original political contract, so
to speak, could provide for an absolutist regime. 8
Equality is the fourth basic idea from the Declaration. Yet
Grotius dismissed the notion of distributive justice. He was moving away from the wars of Protestantism (he almost lost his life in
one such dispute), and thereby its focus on equality. In fact, he
dedicated his book to King Louis of France!
Finally, the Declaration refers to the right of revolution.
"Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these
ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it." Grotius
recognized no such natural right of resistance. However, he developed a long list of circumstances in which resistance in some form
or another, usually other than outright abolition, was justified.' 9
For the foregoing reasons, Zuckert concludes that Grotius was
the link between medieval views and those of John Locke. Locke,
of course, was the enlightenment political philosopher whose ideas
about consent and the body politic significantly influenced the author of the Declaration, Thomas Jefferson. Zuckert also suggests
that Trenchard and Gordon, the writers of Cato'sLetters, were the
link between Locke and the future."
Consequently, it is most unlikely that Grotius was of direct
influence on Marshall's jurisprudence, especially as he said little
15. The proper or better characterization of Marshall's views is discussed at
length by Hobson. CHARLES HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN
MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 16-25 and related footnotes (1996).
16. See MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW
REPUBLICANISM 139-42 (1994).
17. GROTIUS, supra note 5, at Book 2, Ch. 5, para. 17.
18. See generally, ZUCKERT, supra note 16, at 258-59, 368 n. 36.
19. GROTIUS, supra note 5, at Book 1, Ch. 4, para. 2.
20. See ZUCKERT, supra note 16, at 297-319.
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or nothing specific about the role of judges on a constitutional
court. As will be developed below, Chief Justice Marshall was
more a "modern" than either Grotius or Blackstone, the eighteenth-century British jurist who adopted many of Grotius' ideas.
Marshall's views, as were those of Madison and other early American constitutional thinkers, were sufficiently creative and experimental, that it is a distortion to attribute their origins too much to
Grotius or any other pre-modern political philosopher.
II. THE

MEANING OF JOHN MARSHALL'S DISSENT IN OGDEN V.
SAUNDERS

Professor Clinton offers as a brief summary of Marshall's approach to and support for limited judicial review the following pas21
sage from Ogden v. Saunders:
The principles of construction which ought to be applied to the Constitution of the United states [are well known] ...To say that the

intention of the instrument must prevail; that this intention must
be collected from its words; that its words are to be understood in
that sense in which they are generally used by those for whom the
instrument was intended; that its provisions are neither to be restricted into insignificance nor extended to objects not comprehended in them, nor contemplated by its framers;-is to repeat what
has been
already said more at large, and is all that can be neces22
sary.

I accept this as a summary of the Chief Justice's approach,
but I offer an alternative understanding of Marshall's constitutional interpretation that makes him a much more activist jurist
than Clinton argues he is.
A. "Those for whom the instrument was intended' 3
This phrase does not refer to the drafters of the instrument
but rather to the people who live under the Constitution. For
James Madison, those who ratified the Constitution in the state
conventions were of particular relevance. As Madison dramatically said during the debate in the House of Representatives on
the Jay Treaty in 1796:
Whatever veneration might be entertained for the body of men who
formed the Constitution, the sense of that body could never be regarded as the oracular guide in expounding the Constitution. As the
instrument came from them it was nothing more than the draft of a
plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and vitality were breathed
into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the several state
conventions. If we were to look, therefore, for the meaning of the instrument beyond the face of the instrument, we must look for it, not
21. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
22. Id. at 232.
23. Id.
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in the General Convention, which proposed, but in the State Conventions, which accepted and ratified the Constitution. 4
Those for whom the instrument was intended also are future
generations. Hamilton made this explicitly clear, especially in the
25
opening paragraph of the first of the FederalistPapers.
Marshall
himself not only recognized this, he used it as a major premise for
his interpretive approach to delineating the powers of the national
government. In 1819, long before it was a reality, he wrote of "this
vast republic, from the St. Croix to the Gulf of Mexico, from the Atlantic to the Pacific.. .," and of the government having the necessary powers to meet the "exigencies of the nation...
B. The Nature of the Instrument
Charles Hobson, in discussing the significance of Marshall's
famous line "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding,"27 says Marshall "meant only that the Constitution
should not be read as a detailed blueprint for governing; it did not
signify approval of the idea of an evolving Constitution."28 Yet he
cited in a footnote a statement of Marshall's in an earlier opinion,
Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux," which suggests Marshall meant
something of substantive significance and was not merely referring to the drafting differences between constitutions and statutes.
In Deveaux, Marshall said "A constitution, from its nature, deals
in generals, not in detail ... Its framers cannot perceive minute
distinctions which arise in the progress of the nation, and therefore confine it to the establishment of broad and general principles." °
Jack Rakove, in Original Meanings, says the Committee on
Detail, which drafted the original text of the Constitution, "generally followed" the advice given it by Edmond Randolph:
In the draught of a fundamental constitution two things deserve attention:
1. To insert essential principles only; lest the operations of government should be clogged by rendering those provisions permanent
and unalterable, which ought to be accommodated to times and
events; and

24. JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 362 (1996) (quoting James Madison). Rakove acknowledges that Madison appears to have contradicted himself on the questions of how best to determine original intent and its relevance
to constitutional interpretation. See id. at 339-365.
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
26. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
27. Id. at 407.
28. CHARLES F. HOBSON, supra note 15 at 119.
29. 9 U.S. ( 5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
30. Id. at 87.
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2. To use simple and precise language, and general propositions, according to the example of the constitutions of the several states (for
of a constitution necessarily differs from that of
the construction
3
law).
Again, Marshall would appear to agree. In his Defense of
McCulloch, writing as a Friend of the Constitution, he writes: "No
one of the circumstances which might seem to justify rather a
strict construction (as opposed to what Hobson calls a "fair construction") (as suggested by Hampden, Marshall's critic in this debate) apply to a constitution. . .. "
Marshall continues that a Constitution is not a contract between enemies; not a zero-sum situation; not a contract with a
single object. Rather, it is constitutive of a government and a people. In his words Marshall said: "The powers of government are
conferred for their own benefit.. .and to be exercised for their
good." It is intended to be a general system for all future times, to
be adopted by those who administer it, to all future occasions." '
Thus, it seems clear that Marshall saw the Constitution as fundamentally different from a statute, and as being adaptable in future applications depending upon changed circumstances.
C.

"Provisionsneither restricted to insignificance nor extended to
objects not contemplated by its framers"

The key words are those italicized. The Constitution is to be
interpreted in light of the objects contemplated by the framers.
This is what Clinton calls "the mischief rule," if I understand him
correctly.
So what was the mischief to be addressed, the objects contemplated by the framers? Rakove, again in OriginalMeanings,
says that the experimental democratic experiences that emanated
from both the Articles of Confederation and the eleven state constitutions adopted in the relatively brief period between the end of
the American Revolution and the creation of the Constitution were
"the greatest influence in the debates of 1787-88."35 Hobson goes a
step further and refers to the relevance and weight Marshall gives
to this period as a "bias" of Marshall, himself."
If there was "mischief," and it was to be remedied, the constitutional system must be such that government has the requisite
energy to do the job. As the earlier quote indicates, Marshall was
sure the national government had the authority, power, or energy
31. RAKOVE, supra note 24, at 342.
32. JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 170 (Gerald
Gunther ed., 1969).

33. Id.
34. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 332.
35. RAKOVE, supra note 24, at 21.
36. See HOBSON, supra note 15, at 207.
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to conquer the continent. And William Novick in his recent book,
The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century
America (1996), makes a compelling case that the states also had
plenty of energy in their police power to deal with private economic power.
Professor Clinton, however, asserts that the Constitution
should be understood as binding, not liberating, and that rather
than accommodate, or even contemplate change, it was meant to
confine or limit it!3" It seems to me, though, that the immediately
preceding comments about "energy" and "police powers" of the
states rebut those assertions. Further, the text of the Preamble of
the Constitution expressly speaks in terms of liberation and future
generations. I'll leave this point without saying more and await
Sandy Olken's article on the meaning and relevance of the Preamble.38
This analysis reinforces the point made in Part Four below.
The institutional structure was and is a complex human construct.
The concern was with power-both governmental and private economic power-how to harness it to do good and to limit it from doing ill.3 9 That is what separation of powers, federalism, republicanism, majority rule, juries, and judicial review, among other
essential constitutional features, have always been about and why
they remain such contentious concepts.
The structure can be thought of as a picture puzzle where if
one piece is changed the picture is changed. I think John Kenneth
Galbraith's phrase "countervailing powers" captures my point.
There is a delicate balance within each component of the structure
and between the components of the overall structure. The balance
is between the constraining features (to protect liberty and property) and the liberating features (to facilitate the pursuit of happiness).

37. Clinton, supra note 2, at 959-688.
38. Samuel R. Olken, The Constitution as an Article of Faith: Chief Justice
John Marshall and the Preamble (manuscript in progress) (arguing in part,
that for Marshall, the Preamble embodied several fundamental tenets of a
constitutional democracy, including popular sovereignty; respect for individual

liberty; limited governmental authority and recognition of the importance of
change consistent with broad notions of social justice). Professor Olken asserts that Marshall, at times, relied upon the Preamble to interpret the inter-

stices of the Constitution and that his frequent references- both direct and
indirect- to the Preamble in his constitutional opinions demonstrated not
only his implicit faith in the United States as an experiment in constitutional

democracy but also his perception that the framers intended the Constitution
to function in a practical sense in a democratic republic.)

39. For the significance of James Madison's recognition of the importance of
regulating private economic power, see generally Walter J. Kendall, The Republican Revival Debate - Private Economic Power, the Forgotten Factor, 16 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 363 (1991).
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III. THE

SIGNIFICANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Assuming Professor Clinton is correct that the proper understanding of Marshall's view of the role of the Court was essentially
"departmental," ° what did the institutional structure it was a part
of look like? Among the most significant features of the governmental systems in 1789 that protected the rights of the people and
made its decisions reflective of the will of the people were the written Constitution itself and federalism. There was also public opinion formed, in part at least, by a free press, manifested in elections, and aggregated in the legislative process; impeachment; the
amendment process; and, most importantly, the jury. That is because juries regularly asserted and exercised the powers to determine both the facts and the law, and thereby were an absolute
check on governmental action focused on an individual.
I suggest that these institutions have diminished in their effectiveness as checks on specific instances of governmental excess
and abuse. Despite recent revitalization of states' rights, federalism is not what it was. Administrative agencies have immunized
much public policy from control by the people. The impeachment
and amendment processes are seldom used. And the press isn't
what it used to be. Again, most importantly, the role of the jury
has been eroded dramatically. To limit, if not eliminate juries as
the ultimate check, a series of innovations have been introduced
beginning as far back as Lord Mansfield's tenure on the English
bench. These include "special pleading, special verdicts, compulsory nonsuits, (binding) instructions in law and evidence to juries,
and the setting aside of verdicts for decisions that were contrary to
law or to the evidence (as determined by the judge)."4 Assessment
of the current role of the jury has to also consider the elimination
of the requirement of unanimous twelve person juries in many circumstances.
I am suggesting this all has resulted in a sufficient change in
the institutional arrangement of the governmental system to support, if not require, more active judicial review along the lines suggested by Justice Jackson in Carolene Products' footnote 4.4.
IV. LINGUISTIC UNCERTAINTY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION

The quote from Ogden v. Saunders upon which Professor
Clinton relies states that the intention of the Constitution "must
40. See MATTHEW J. FRANCK, AGAINST THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY-THE
SUPREME COURT vs. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE 67 (and the authori-

ties cited in the footnotes) (1996).
41. See generally FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 40-41 (and the authorities

cited in the footnotes) (1985).
42. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
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be collected from its words."43 I want to focus on the word "words."
Professor Clinton says linguistic uncertainty as a cause for interpretation was unknown to John Marshall and his contemporaries. He goes so far as to assert that there is a "true" meaning of
those who see linguistic uncertainty guilty of
the text, making
"sophistry." 4 In denying the reality of linguistic uncertainty, or at
least its relevance, Professor Clinton cites Grotius' chapter on "Interpretation." Yet, in that chapter, Grotius himself refers to words
admitting of several interpretations, to conspicuous obscurity in
some words, and to the fact that many words have several meanings.45
James Madison, in The FederalistNo. 31, addresses the reality and significance of the obscurities inherent in "the institutions
of man." Specifically, he acknowledges that "no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so
correct as not to include many equivocally denoting different
ideas." He specifies "three sources of vague and incorrect definitions: indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of conception, inadequateness of the vehicle of idea,
46 (a)ny one of (which)
must produce a certain degree of obscurity."
Charles Hobson, in The Great Chief Justice, would appear to
agree with Madison. Citing several John Marshall opinions, he
says: "Judicial power as exercised in expounding written law was
largely founded on the imprecision, obscurity, and ambiguity of
language that inevitably characterized even the most carefully
drawn statute or other legal instrument." 7
Let me go further and offer some very preliminary thoughts
based on a reading of Roman Jakobson's essay, The Speech Event
and the Functions of Language. Jakobson sets out six factors of
The (1) ADDRESSER sends a (2)
any verbal communication.
MESSAGE to the (3) ADDRESSEE. To be operative the message requires a (4) CONTEXT. There must be a (5) CODE common to both
addresser and addressee, and a (6) CONTACT or physical or psychological way to stay in touch. 8
Is it possible that the many legal theories of interpretation
proposed during the last fifteen or twenty years correspond to an
emphasis on different factors or parts of verbal communication? I
want to most tentatively propose that there is something to be said
for the following alignment:
Interpretive theory focuses on particularFactor
Addresser
Phenomenologists
43. Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 332.
44. Clinton, supra note 2 at 949.

45. GROTIUS, supra note 5, Book 2, Ch. 16, para. 1-12.
46. JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 37.
47. HOBSON, supra note 15, at 192.

48. ROMAN JAKOBSON, ON LANGUAGE 69-79 (Linda R. Waugh and Monique
Monville-Burston eds., 1990).
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Deconstruction
Law and Economics
Marxists
Structuralists
McLuhan
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Message
Addressee
Context
Code
Contact

In any event, to the extent Professor Clinton's analysis and others'
depends on the absence or illegitimacy of linguistic uncertainty, he
is and they are out of step with both historic and contemporary
theory and fact. On a more positive note, perhaps there is some
common ground. Professor Clinton's "mischief rule" and his references to Aristotle's practical reason 9 sound similar to Karl Llesense' ° and flexible enough to accommodate Jawellyn's
kobson's situation
multi-factor view of language.
V.

THREE BRANCHES OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN A SYSTEM
OF CHECKS AND BALANCES

I have two additional but related thoughts in response to two
threads in several of the presentations and comments at this symposium. First, the Supreme Court is not autonomous, even if the
law otherwise is or should be. The Supreme Court at least is the
third branch of government. The members of the Court are partisans, not just savants, to use the categories proposed by Professor
White. Partisans, according to Professor White, may be inevitable,
but they are corrupt in the eighteenth-century sense. Madison, on
the other hand, was equally judgmental in a sense, but saw that
partisanship or faction, if properly channeled by the structures
and system of government, actually contributed to social, political,
and economic progress."
Second, almost without exception, the speakers have referred
to the tri-part and federal system as "separation of powers." This
label tends to reinforce a formalist or "departmental" understanding of the role of each branch or level of government. Yet plainly
the Constitution is a system of checks and balances. Madison
dismissed parchment barriers in The FederalistNo. 48 and emphasized that each branch had real power and authority to check
and balance the other.5" This Madisonian view supports a functionalist and dynamic understanding of the role of each branch
and level of government.
These two additional points, that the Court is a governing institution and the system is one of dynamic checks and balances,
49. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 6.5.1140a 25-31.
50. Karl Liewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons about How Statutues are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV.

395, 401 (1950).
51. JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 10.
52. JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 48.
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further undercut the argument of Clinton and most of the other
speakers that the founders and Chief Justice Marshall had and
practiced a cramped view of judicial review. The revisionists may
persist, but they can succeed only by ignoring both Madison and
Marshall.

